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application of rational choices. This is then used to obtain a characterization of set-
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Uniqueness is not guaranteed but our proof is constructive and an explicit solution
is provided in terms of approximation choice functions.
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The literature on abstract choice theory abounds with analysis of the possi-
ble rationality of a choice function via satisfaction of consistency properties,
although the precise meaning of the term “rationality” is subject to interpreta-
tions. The identiﬁcation of rational choice as “optimizing behavior” has a long
tradition in the literature. A standard position identiﬁes a rational choice
function with the result of the optimization of a generating binary relation
irrespective of its properties (cf., Arrow [6], Richter [21,22], Wilson [31], Sen
[24], Blair et al. [9], Suzumura [28], etc). In addition, the literature vastly
deals with enhanced generating relations, and the implications of acyclicity,
transitivity, quasi-transitivity, ... are extensively studied.
Another aspect to bear in mind is the possibility of incorporating diﬀerent
criteria into the process. Previous contributions have approached this topic
in several forms. Kalai et al. [15] study the rationality of a choice function
by multiple binary relations, when the choice is a single element and all the
relations are simultaneously applied to each set of alternatives. Houy [13]
analyses whether the order of the criteria aﬀects the ﬁnal choice or not. Various
procedures of choice for lexicographic applications of multiple criteria have
been considered by Houy and Tadenuma [14]. In this paper we focus on the
case where a number of criteria are applied in a sequential way, a process
that we call sequential choice. Under this general perspective, the bahavior of
a decision maker (DM) is conceived of as rational not only when his choice
function derives from a single binary relation, but also when it is the sequential
application of such type of choices.
Our contribution adds to a branch of the literature from which we pinpoint
two focal references. In the ﬁrst place, Manzini and Mariotti [16] are concerned
with singled-valued choice functions that are the result of a sequential appli-
cation of binary relations. They provide a complete analysis of the case of two
and three relations. In the second place, Apesteguía and Ballester [5] comple-
ment this achievement and characterize singled-valued choice functions that
can be rationalized by the sequential application of any number of rational
choice functions. By contrast with these works, we approach the problem in
terms of set-valued choice functions although we restrict ourselves to the se-
quential application of two relations. We also emphasize that we do not require
the asymmetry restriction imposed by them to the binary relations in their
model. In addition to those references, Masatlioglu et al. [18] study a related
model under single-valued choice functions. They admit the possibility of se-
lecting an alternative x in the presence of y when the DM prefers y, because
he simply does not realize that y is also available. This model concerns a DM
that only pays attention to a subset from each set of alternatives, which can
be considered as a set-valued choice function. From this subset a ﬁnal unique
2selection is made.
Since we aim at identifying choices that arise from a sequential application of
rational choice functions, a crucial previous step is the analysis of the behav-
ior of rationality with respect to composition (technically: of the rationality
properties of the compound choice function). To this purpose, in Section 2 we
set our notation and recall rationality properties of choice that are the key
to analyse rational choice functions. Then in Section 3 we study some axioms
for choice functions that permit to infer relevant properties of their compound
function. Aizerman and Aleskerov [3] made a partial study of this issue, to
which we add with further conclusions. Besides, the usual characterizations of
rationalizability of choice functions permit to state direct corollaries in terms
of rationality of a choice function obtained by the composition of two rational
choice functions.
Finally we approach the problem of identifying choice functions that arise as
the composition of two rational choice functions, that is, choice functions that
are rational by two sequential criteria. We give a complete characterization via
two testable necessary and suﬃcient conditions, and an explicit expression for
a solution (uniqueness can not be guaranteed) is provided. This constitutes
Section 4. We conclude with some ﬁnal remarks in Section 5.
2 Deﬁnitions and properties of rationality
In this section we set the notation and introduce properties of rationality for
a choice function that are common in related literature.
Along this paper X denotes a general set of alternatives and P(X) is the set of
subsets of X: A binary relation on X is a subset R  X X; and we interpret
xRy –a shorthand for (x;y) 2 R– as “x is weakly preferred to y”. Besides, R
produces a strict relation PR (the asymmetric part of R) and an indiﬀerence
relation IR (the symmetric part of R) on X according to:
xPRy , fxRy and not yRxg; and xIRy , fxRy and yRxg:
The following properties of a binary relation are relevant in our study.
Deﬁnition 1 Let R be a binary relation on X:
 R is reﬂexive if xRx for all x 2 X:
 R is transitive if whenever xRy and yRz it is true that xRz:
 R is complete if for any x;y 2 X either xRy or yRx is true.
 R is an ordering if it is transitive and complete.
3 R is quasi-transitive if its asymmetric part PR is transitive.
 R is acyclic if for any ﬁnite sequence of alternatives fx1;:::;xtg such that
(x1;x2) 2 PR;(x2;x3) 2 PR;:::;(xt 1;xt) 2 PR
one has (xt;x1) 62 PR:
Deﬁnitions 2 and 3 below formalize the concepts of decisive choice function
and rational choice function.
Deﬁnition 2 Let D be a nonempty domain of nonempty subsets of X, that
is, ? 6= D  P(X) and S 6= ? for all S 2 D: A decisive choice function on
D is a map C : D ! P(X) such that ? 6= C(S)  S for all S 2 D:
Unless otherwise stated, along this paper we are bound by two technical re-
strictions. Firstly, all choice functions are decisive thus choice function holds
for decisive choice function. Secondly, D is the domain consisting of all ﬁnite
and nonempty subsets of X: 3
Deﬁnition 3 A choice function C on D is rational if there exists a binary
relation R on X such that C(S) = CR(S) = fx 2 S : 8y 2 S; (x;y) 2 Rg; for
any set of alternatives S 2 D:
Deﬁnition 3 captures the idea that the choice is made by optimization of a
preference relation R, and we also say that R rationalizes the choice function
C: When the preference relation R is an ordering, it renders complete rational-
ity and we say that C is full rational; if R is quasi-transitive then we say that
the choice function C is quasi-transitive rational; and if R is acyclic then the
choice function C is acyclic rational. Of course, full rationality implies quasi-
transitive rationality, which in turn implies acyclic rationality. As D contains
all singletons and pairs of alternatives, any binary relation that rationalizes a
decisive choice function on D is reﬂexive and complete.
Deﬁnitions 4 and 5 below concern a choice function C on a domain D: They
respectively deal with contraction and expansion properties that are crucial
for our analysis.
Deﬁnition 4 The choice function C satisﬁes
 The Chernoﬀ condition, also CH, if for any S;T 2 D such that S  T
we have C(T) \ S  C(S):
3 The results would not be aﬀected if the domain includes all the inﬁnite subsets as
well, and even some of them are true for domains containing all pairs and all triples
from X only. We set this framework in order to avoid unnecessary technicalities and
concentrate on the sequential application of criteria.
4 Arrow’s axiom, also A, if for any S;T 2 D such that S  T it is true
that C(T) \ S = C(S):
 The Superset property, also SUP, if for all S;T 2 D such that S  T
and C(T)  C(S) we have C(S) = C(T):
It is obvious that Arrow’s axiom is stronger than the Chernoﬀ condition.
Deﬁnition 5 We say that C satisﬁes Property  (cf., Sen [24]), also ; if
for any collection fMigi2I of subsets of D the following holds true:
x 2 C(Mi) for all i 2 I entails x 2 C ([i2IMi)
This property is stronger than the Concordance property which establishes
that C(S) \ C(T)  C(S [ T) throughout. We are especially interested in a
generalization of Property  that we call the binariness property 4 .
Deﬁnition 6 The choice function C satisﬁes the Binariness property, also
B, if for any S 2 D we have: x 2 C(fx;yg) for all y 2 S implies x 2 C(S):
Properties CH, SUP, and  are independent, but Arrow’s axiom is stronger
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3 Rationality of a compound choice function
As has been mentioned, we are interested in identifying choice functions that
arise from a sequential application of rational choice functions. Therefore a
crucial previous step is the analysis of the behavior of rationality with respect
to composition. From a technical perspective, we proceed to study the preser-
vation of certain rationality properties of choice functions under the operation
of composition, because such properties characterize rationalizability.
We ﬁrst formalize the idea of a sequential application of two criteria of decision
making.
4 This postulate is also named the Direct Condorcet Property or Condorcet consis-
tency in the literature.
5Deﬁnition 7 Let X be a set of alternatives and C1 : D1 ! P(X) and C2 :
D2 ! P(X) two choice functions with respective domains D1 and D2, in such
way that C1(D1)  D2. We deﬁne the composition of C1 and C2; also the
compound function of C1 and C2; as the map C2  C1 : D1 ! P(X) given by
(C2  C1)(A) = C2(C1(A)) for all A 2 D1
Following our convention we assume D1 = D2 = D; the domain of all ﬁnite
and nonempty subsets of alternatives.
Now we recall a characterization theorem for full rational choice functions.
Theorem 1 (Arrow [6]) A choice function C over D is full rational if and
only if it satisﬁes Arrow’s axiom.
Aizerman and Aleskerov [3] have established that Arrow’s axiom is preserved
under the composition of choice functions. Thus we can state:
Corollary 1 Whenever we have full rational choice functions C1;:::;Cn on
D, the choice function Cn  :::  C1 is full rational too.
We continue our inspection with the case of quasi-transitive rational choice
functions. We begin recalling the following characterization theorem.
Theorem 2 (Blair et al. [9], p. 367) A choice function C on D is quasi-
transitive rational if and only if it satisﬁes CH, SUP and B.
Although the composition of two choice functions that satisfy CH does not
necessarily preserve such property, if C1 satisﬁes A and C2 satisﬁes CH then
C2  C1 satisﬁes CH too (cf., Aizerman and Aleskerov [3]). We proceed to
study to what extent properties SUP and B are preserved by composition.
Propositions 1 and 2 below provide insights in this respect.
Proposition 1 Let C1 and C2 be choice functions on D: If C1 satisﬁes A and
C2 satisﬁes SUP, then C2  C1 satisﬁes SUP.
Proof. Let us select S;T 2 D such that S  T and (C2C1)(T)  (C2C1)(S):
We must prove that (C2  C1)(S) = (C2  C1)(T):
As C1 satisﬁes A we have C1(T) \ S = C1(S); thus C1(S)  C1(T):
Because C2 (C1(T))  C2 (C1(S)) and C2 satisﬁes SUP, we can conclude (C2 
C1)(S) = (C2  C1)(T): 
6Proposition 2 Let C1 be a choice function on D that satisﬁes B and CH. If
C2 is a choice function on D that satisﬁes B then C2  C1 satisﬁes B too.
Proof.
We have to prove that for any S 2 D
x 2 (C2  C1)(fx;yg);8y 2 S ) x 2 (C2  C1)(S)
Since C2 satisﬁes B we have
x 2 C2(fx;zg); 8z 2 C1(S) ) x 2 C2(C1(S))
Then we are done if we prove that x 2 C2(fx;zg) holds true for any z 2 C1(S):
We ﬁrst observe that z 2 C1(S) implies z 2 C1(fx;zg) for all x 2 S because
C1 satisﬁes CH.
Moreover from x 2 C2(C1(fx;yg)) for all y 2 S; we deduce x 2 C1(fx;yg) for
all y 2 S: Therefore C1(fx;zg) = fx;zg for all z 2 C1(S):
Also from x 2 C2(C1(fx;yg)) 8y 2 S we obtain
x 2 C2(C1(fx;zg)) = C2(fx;zg) 8z 2 C1(S)
which concludes the proof. 
Corollary 2 below establishes the quasi-transitive rationality of the compound
choice function of a full rational choice function with a quasi-transitive ratio-
nal. Afterwards a short analysis of the structure of the composition of quasi-
transitive rational choice functions complements such result.
Corollary 2 Let C1 and C2 be choice functions deﬁned on D: If C1 is full
rational and C2 is quasi-transitive rational, then C2  C1 is quasi-transitive
rational.
If we relax the assumptions of Corollary 2 to quasi-transitive rationality to C1;
then the compound choice function may not satisfy the superset property as
the next example proves.
Example 1 Let X = fx;y;z;tg and let us deﬁne the next choice functions























Both choice functions satisfy property  (therefore B), CH and SUP. Their












which does not satisfy SUP because C(fx;z;tg) = fzg $ C(fx;zg):
From Proposition 2 we obtain the following consequence.
Corollary 3 Let C be a choice function on D: If C is a compound function
of quasi-transitive rational choice functions, then C satisﬁes B.
5 Because all choice functions in the paper are decisive we avoid the redundant
assertion ‘C(fag) = fag for every a 2 X’ throughout.
8Finally we recall the conditions for a choice function to be acyclic rational or,
equivalently, rational. 6
Theorem 3 (Blair et al. [9]) A choice function on D is acyclic rational if
and only if it satisﬁes the Chernoﬀ condition and the binariness property.
An appeal to Proposition 2 and Theorem 3 produces the next immediate
consequence.
Corollary 4 Let C1 and C2 be choice functions deﬁned on D: If C1 is full
rational and C2 is acyclic rational then C2  C1 is acyclic rational.
Nevertheless if we compound two quasi-transitive rational choice functions we
obtain a choice function that is not necessarily acyclic rational, because it may
not satisfy the Chernoﬀ condition as the next example proves.
























Both C1 and C2 satisfy  (therefore B), CH and SUP.
6 Suzumura [29, page 35] establishes that a choice function on D is acyclic rational if
and only if it is rational, and that this equivalence does not hold for general domains.












and it does not satisfy CH because fx;z;tg  fx;y;z;tg but
C(fx;y;z;tg) \ fx;z;tg = fx;tg * fx;zg = C(fx;z;tg)
Our next Proposition gathers some conclusions from the analysis above.
Proposition 3 If C1 and C2 are choice functions on D that satisfy CH and
B then C2  C1 may not satisfy CH (Example 2), thus it may not be acyclic
rational (, rational). Therefore the compound choice function of two acyclic
rational (, rational) choice functions is not necessarily rational. Even if C1
and C2 are quasi-transitive rational (, both satisfy CH, B and SUP), then
C2  C1 is not necessarily rational.
We conclude this Section with the following immediate consequence of Propo-
sition 2.
Corollary 5 Let C be a choice function on D: If C is a compound function
of acyclic rational (or equivalently, rational) choice functions on D; then C
satisﬁes B.
4 Choice functions rational by two sequential criteria
Along this Section our primitive concept is the choice made by a decision-
maker for some sets of alternatives. We investigate when this behavior can
be explained by the sequential application of two rational choice functions.
Theorem 5 below completely characterizes such class of choice functions. Some
examples help to clarify its implications.
To this porpose we ﬁrst introduce the concepts of upper and lower approxi-
mations of a choice function in a class (Aizerman and Aleskerov [3]). They
try to approximate a non-rational choice function by a rational one and in the
10end, yield a solution to the problem we have posed ourselves. We emphasize
that not only we characterize the choice functions that can be written as the
composition of two rational ones but also we give an explicit solution to that
problem.
Let Q an arbitrary class of choice functions on D: A common interpretation
is that Q contains all choice functions that verify certain relevant properties.
Deﬁnition 8 The upper approximation in Q of a choice function C is a choice
function Cu 2 Q such that C(S)  Cu(S) for any S 2 D; with the property
that if  C is another choice function in Q satisfying C(S)   C(S) for all S 2 D;
it must be the case that Cu(S)   C(S) for all S 2 D: We stress the fact that
Cu is forcefully decisive because so is C and C(S)  Cu(S) throughout.
Deﬁnition 9 The lower approximation in Q of a choice function C is a (pos-
sibly indecisive) choice function Cl 2 Q such that Cl(S)  C(S) for any
S 2 D; with the property that if  C is another choice function in Q satisfy-
ing  C(S)  C(S) for all S 2 D; it must be the case that  C(S)  Cl(S) for all
S 2 D:
When a choice function is the sequential application of two rational choice
functions, the latter functions verify CH and B. Focusing on such class for
analysis is meaningful and in fact, to our purposes the relevant class is the one
containing the choice functions that verify CH and  that we denote by Q0:
The next result (Theorem 5.15 in Aizerman and Aleskerov [3]) assures that
upper approximations in Q0 exist and also that lower approximations in Q0
exist under B.
Theorem 4 For any choice function C on D the upper approximation in Q0
exists, and it is given by the expression
C
u(S) = fx 2 S : 8y 2 S there exists S
0 2 D with x;y 2 S
0 and x 2 C(S
0)g
for any S 2 D:
Moreover if C satisﬁes B then the lower approximation of C in Q0 exists, and
it is given by the expression
C
l(S) = fx 2 S : x 2 C(fx;yg); 8y 2 Sg for any S 2 D:
Remark 1 By virtue of Theorem 3 we conclude that Cu in Theorem 4 is
rational. Alternatively it is easy to check that
Ru deﬁned as xRuy , 9S 2 D : x;y 2 S and x 2 C(S) rationalizes Cu
The rationality of Cl in Theorem 4 can not be directly derived from Theorem 3
11because Cl(S) may be empty for some S 2 D: Nevertheless the complete binary
relation Rl given by xRly if and only if x 2 C(fx;yg) rationalizes Cl:
We now introduce a new property for a choice function C on D: It provides
the solution to the main problem of the paper.
Deﬁnition 10 A choice function C satisﬁes Property P if for any x;y 2 X
and S;T 2 D such that fx;yg  S  T; the following holds true:
if C(fx;yg) = fxg and x 2 C(T); then it must be the case that y 62 C(S)
Property P is weaker than the Chernoﬀ condition thus any rational choice
function satisﬁes it. Moreover this property allows for cyclical patterns.
The next example shows that if a choice function on D satisﬁes property P
then it must satisfy neither binariness nor the Chernoﬀ condition, the two
necessary and suﬃcient conditions for such choice function to be rational.
Example 3 Let C be the choice function deﬁned on the domain of nonempty












This choice function does not satisfy the binariness property because x 2
C(fx;yg) and x 2 C(fx;zg) but x 62 C(fx;y;zg): Moreover it does not satisfy
the Chernoﬀ condition because C(fx;y;z;tg)\fx;y;zg = fx;yg * C(fx;y;zg):
Nonetheless C satisﬁes property P:
In addition there exist choice functions satisfying Property  which do not
satisfy property P as we can observe in Example 4 below.
Example 4 Let C be a choice function deﬁned on the domain of nonempty












It is simple to check that C satisﬁes Property : However it does not satisfy P
since fx;yg  fx;y;zg  fx;y;z;tg and C(fx;yg) = fyg; y 2 C(fx;y;z;tg);
but x 2 C(fx;y;zg):
Despite this performance we proceed to prove that a choice function satisfying
properties P and  can be written as the composition of two rational choice
functions. We formalize this concept in the next deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 11 A choice function C on D is rational by two sequential criteria
if there exist two rational choice functions C1 and C2 on D (C2 being possibly
indecisive) such that C = C2  C1; i.e., such that the composition of C1 and C2
yields C: 7
Rational choice functions are obviously rational by two sequential criteria,
but the converse is not true as shown by Example 5 below. In turn, Lemma 1
shows that the composition of rational choice functions satisﬁes .
Lemma 1 If C1 and C2 are rational choice functions on D; then the compound
choice function C2  C1 satisﬁes Property :
Proof. Let us denote the binary relations that rationalize C1 and C2 by R1
and R2 respectively, i.e., for all S 2 D;
C1(S) = fx 2 S : (x;y) 2 R1; 8y 2 Sg = CR1(S)
C2(S) = fx 2 S : (x;y) 2 R2; 8y 2 Sg = CR2(S)
We denote C = C2  C1, i.e., C(S) = CR2(CR1(S)) throughout. We proceed to
check that C satisﬁes Property :
Let fSigi2I be a collection of sets in D such that x 2 C(Si) for all i 2 I:
We must prove that x 2 C(
S
i2I Si): Since x 2 CR2(CR1(Si)) for all i 2 I thus
7 Observe that C2 must be nonempty-valued on fC1(S) : S 2 Dg:
13x 2 CR1(Si) for all i 2 I, this leads to
xR1y for all y 2 Si 8i 2 I ) xR1y 8y 2
[
i2I




If x 62 CR2(CR1(
S
i2I Si)); then there exists z 2 CR1(
S
i2I Si) such that :(xR2z):
But on the other hand z 2 CR1(
S
i2I Si) implies that z 2 CR1(Si) for some i 2 I:
Because x 2 CR2(CR1(Si)) for all i 2 I we obtain that xR2z; a contradiction
that proves x 2 C(
S
i2I Si): 
Lemma 1 assures that  is a necessary condition for a choice function to be
rational by two sequential criteria. By contrast, Example 5 below shows that
this is not the case for CH: a choice function satisfying  and not CH can be
written as the composition of its rational approximation functions. Moreover
it makes explicit the fact that we can not assure uniqueness of the solution to
our problem.
Example 5 Let X = fx;y;z;tg: We deﬁne the choice function C on the do-












This choice function satisﬁes Property  and it does not satisfy the Chernoﬀ
condition because fx;z;tg  fx;y;z;tg but C(fx;y;z;tg)\fx;z;tg = fx;tg *
fx;zg = C(fx;z;tg). Nevertheless it satisﬁes the weaker property P.
Theorem 4 provides the explicit expressions for the upper and lower rational

























The equality C = Cl  Cu can be checked directly.
Nevertheless these choice functions Cu and Cl do not provide a unique solution
to our problem in this particular case as we can see by replacing Cl with the
choice function  C deﬁned as follows.
 C(fx;yg) = fx;yg
 C(fx;zg) = fx;zg
 C(fx;tg) = fx;tg
 C(fy;zg) = fy;zg
 C(fy;tg) = fy;tg
 C(fz;tg) = fzg
 C(fx;y;zg) = fx;y;zg
 C(fx;y;tg) = fx;y;tg
 C(fx;z;tg) = fx;zg
 C(fy;z;tg) = fy;zg
 C(fx;y;z;tg) = fx;y;zg
 C satisﬁes property  and the Chernoﬀ condition too. Some simple computa-
tions show that C =  C  Cu:
Our main Theorem identiﬁes the class of choice functions that are rational by
two sequential criteria.
Theorem 5 A choice function C on D is rational by two sequential criteria
if and only if it satisﬁes properties  and P: In this case an explicit –but not
15unique– decomposition is C = Cl  Cu.
Proof.
To prove suﬃciency, recall that Theorem 4 yields the existence of the upper
and lower approximations of C in Q0; both being rational choice functions by
Remark 1. The same theorem gives their respective expressions:
C
u(S) = fx 2 S : 8y 2 S there exists S
0 2 D such that x;y 2 S




l(S) = fx 2 S : x 2 C(fx;yg); 8y 2 Sg:
Let us now prove that C = Cl  Cu:
i) C(S)  (Cl  Cu)(S).
If x 2 C(S) then x 2 Cu(S) because we can select S0 = S for all y 2 S:
Let us now suppose that x 62 Cl(Cu(S)): In this case there exists y 2 Cu(S)
such that fyg = C(fx;yg) because of the deﬁnition of Cl:
From y 2 Cu(S) we obtain that for all s 2 S there exists Sys 2 D such
that y;s 2 Sys and y 2 C(Sys):
As C satisﬁes Property  we conclude y 2 C([s2SSys):
Then we have fx;yg  S  [
s2SSys with fyg = C(fx;yg) and y 2
C([s2SSys):
Applying now that P is veriﬁed by C we conclude x 62 C(S); against the
hypothesis. Therefore x 2 Cl(Cu(S)):
ii) C(S)  (Cl  Cu)(S):
Select x 2 Cl(Cu(S)); thus by the deﬁnition of Cl we have that x 2 C(fx;yg)
for all y 2 Cu(S): In particular x 2 C(fx;yg) for all y 2 C(S) (because
C(S)  Cu(S)). As we have that C satisﬁes Property  we conclude x 2
C(C(S))  C(S):
Example 5 accounts for lack of uniqueness.
Conversely, Lemma 1 ensures that if C is the compound choice function of
two rational choice functions CR1 and CR2 then C satisﬁes property , thus it
remains to prove that it satisﬁes property P too.
Let us select fx;yg  S  T such that fxg = (CR2  CR1)(fx;yg) and x 2
(CR2  CR1)(T): We prove that y 62 C(S):
Indeed let us suppose that y 2 C(S): Then we have
(y;s) 2 R1 for all s 2 S and (y;s0) 2 R2 for all s0 2 S such that s0R1s for
all s 2 S
16As we also have that x 2 (CR2 CR1)(T) we obtain (x;t) 2 R1 for all t 2 T: In
particular:
i) (y;x) 2 R1 because x 2 S, and (x;y) 2 R1 because y 2 T; which implies
that CR1(fx;yg) = fx;yg:
ii) (y;x) 2 R2 because xR1t for all t 2 T and S  T; which implies that
y 2 CR2(fx;yg):
Thus y 2 CR2(fx;yg) = CR2(CR1(fx;yg)) = C(fx;yg) which contradicts the
hypothesis and concludes the proof. 
Examples with three alternatives can be designed where Cl in Theorem 5 is
indecisive even if C is single-valued. That is the case of e.g., the choice function
in Masatlioglu et al. [18, page 10] that illustrates their deﬁnition of an attention
ﬁlter. Nonetheless as has been explained, Cl must be nonempty-valued on the
subset fCu(S) : S 2 Dg due to the fact that C = Cl  Cu and C is decisive.
5 Concluding Remarks
We have studied the class of set-valued choice functions that results when we
compound rational choice functions. As a previous step we have performed
an analysis of relevant properties of the compound function that stem from
axioms for choice functions. The following tables gather these results.
C1 C2 C2  C1
A A A ?
A CH CH ?
A C C ?
A SUP SUP y
B+CH B B z






Table 1 Table 2
In Table 1, cases ? are proved in Aizerman and Aleskerov [3]. Example 2
proves that even if SUP and  are imposed then composition does not pre-
serve the Chernoﬀ condition. Nonetheless this property is transmitted to the
compound function when C2 satisﬁes it and C1 satisﬁes the stronger Arrow’s
17axiom. We complement this study with assertions y and z that are proved in
Propositions 1 and 2 respectively.
By using the classical axiomatizations of salient speciﬁcations of rationality
these assertions produce Table 2, where FR, QTR and AR hold for full ra-
tional, quasi-transitive rational and acyclic rational (, rational) respectively.
Corollaries 1 to 5 make the assertions in this table explicit.
We have then tackled an inverse problem: we study when a DM’s behavior can
be explained as the sequential application of two rational choice functions, that
is, when her choice function is rational by two sequential criteria. We obtain a
characterization of this type of set-valued choice functions. Uniqueness is not
guaranteed but our proof is constructive and an explicit solution is provided
in terms of approximation choice functions.
Our results refer to the domain D consisting of all the ﬁnite and nonempty
subsets of the grand set. They would not be aﬀected if the domain includes
all the inﬁnite subsets as well. Some of them remain true for domains that
contain all pairs and all triples from the set of alternatives X: We have focused
on this case in order to avoid unnecessary technicalities and concentrate on
the sequential choice.
Manzini and Mariotti [16] ﬁrst studied the particular case of single-valued
choice functions. By considering that a choice function C is rational when there
is an asymmetric relation P such that C(S) = fx 2 Sj@y 2 S for which (y;x) 2
Pg, they characterize single-valued choice functions that are rational by two
and three sequential criteria. Apesteguía and Ballester [5] extend the Manzini
and Mariotti’s result to the sequential application of an arbitrary number of
rational choice functions. Our article refers to the wider class of set-valued
choice functions, nevertheless it does not compare to their results because
asymmetry is not an issue. The model in Masatlioglu et al. [18] is especially
close to ours when the ﬁlter of attention (the selection of the subset of alter-
natives that the DM actually has in mind when he makes the choice) satisﬁes
the Chernoﬀ condition, but their approach is bound by uniqueness of the
selections and their axiomatics is stated accordingly.
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